| Sara Monemi | |
| Master of Arts in Human rights | |
|
Cet article analyse l’articulation entre le droit de l’enfant à la protection et son autonomie dans l’environnement numérique, notamment en matière d’accès aux réseaux sociaux. En s’appuyant sur la Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits de l’enfant, l’article analyse comment certaines dispositions centrales reconnaissent à la fois la vulnérabilité des enfants, nécessitant une protection particulière, et leur statut de titulaires de droits autonomes, incluant la participation, la liberté d’expression, le respect de la vie privée et l’accès à l’information. Les initiatives législatives récentes dans plusieurs États, telles que les restrictions d’âge concernant l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux, illustrent une tendance croissante à privilégier des mesures protectrices visant à protéger les enfants contre les contenus préjudiciables, l’exploitation et d’autres risques numériques. Cependant, ces mesures peuvent également limiter la participation des enfants et leur capacité à développer leur identité et leur autonomie en ligne. L’article analyse cette tension à la lumière de la théorie des niveaux de conflit juridique de Gregor Noll, selon laquelle les conflits entre protection et autonomie peuvent apparaître aux niveaux technique, normatif et méta-juridique. Il mobilise également la théorie de la vulnérabilité universelle de Martha Fineman ainsi que le concept féministe du « paradoxe de la protection ». L’objectif n’est pas de proposer une solution normative, mais d’examiner comment le droit international des droits de l’enfant conceptualise et encadre cet équilibre dans l’environnement numérique. |
This article examines the legal tension between the child’s right to protection and the child’s right to autonomy in the digital environment, particularly in relation to children’s access to social media. Drawing on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the paper analyses how central provisions frame children both as vulnerable individuals in need of protection and as autonomous rights-holders entitled to participation, expression, privacy and access to information. Recent legislative initiatives in several states, including age-based restrictions on social media, illustrate how governments increasingly emphasise protective measures aimed at shielding children from harmful content, exploitation and digital risks. At the same time, such measures may interfere with children’s participatory rights and their ability to form identity and exercise autonomy online. The article explores this tension through the lens of Gregor Noll’s theory of levels of legal conflict, arguing that conflicts between protection and autonomy may arise at technical, normative and meta-legal levels. It also draws on Martha Fineman’s theory of universal vulnerability and the feminist concept of the “Paradox of Protection” to critically examine how protective measures may unintentionally reinforce dependency or exclusion. Rather than proposing a definitive solution, the article investigates how international child-rights law conceptualises and navigates this balance. It argues that a rights-based regulatory framework must integrate both protection and participation, recognising children as vulnerable yet capable actors within the digital environment. |
|
Social media has started to shape the world, and at the same time children’s presence in the digital environment has continued to grow, which has led to the discussion, because of the negative impacts, whether children’s use should be restricted, or even prohibited. In recent years, it is also the case that several states, such as Sweden, France, Australia and the U.S.A. have introduced legislation aimed at restricting or even prohibiting children’s access to social media, with the stated aim to protect the child, e.g. blanket age-based exclusion for children wanting to use social media, as well as parental controls. |
|
|
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the child as being holder of their own rights, considering that they are particularly vulnerable and therefore in need of special protection. As much as the child needs to be protected, the child also has a right to grow and develop as an autonomous individual. The perception of children being vulnerable, and in need of protection from adults, has been challenged by inter alia Martha Fineman, challenging this underlying and dichotomous understanding of children as vulnerable in contrast to adults. Instead, she refers to vulnerability as “universal vulnerability”, meaning that the state of being vulnerable does not only refer to some groups but that being vulnerable is a fundamental human trait which everyone beholds. Vulnerability is, and should be, universal and constant, according to Fineman. |
L’avis du Comité scientifique
Cet article analyse la tension entre protection et autonomie des droits de l’enfant dans l’environnement numérique. S’appuyant sur la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, il souligne que l’enfant est à la fois vulnérable et titulaire de droits fondamentaux, tels que la participation et la liberté d’expression. Les législations récentes, notamment les restrictions d’âge sur les réseaux sociaux, privilégient une logique de protection contre les risques numériques. Cependant, ces mesures peuvent limiter les libertés essentielles, comme l’accès à l’information et la construction de l’identité. L’article mobilise la théorie de Gregor Noll pour montrer que ce conflit se situe à plusieurs niveaux juridiques. Il s’appuie aussi sur la vulnérabilité universelle de Fineman et le « paradoxe de la protection ». Celui-ci révèle que des mesures trop protectrices peuvent freiner l’autonomie des enfants. L’auteure défend une approche globale conciliant protection et participation. Patricia JONASON Professeur de droit public à l’Université de Södertörn. |
|
Restriction or prohibition of social media may aim to protect the child from exploitation, exposure to harmful content, mental health issues, among other things – which is in line with Article 3 (best interests of the child) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, including their need for inter alia protection from various forms of harm, violence and abuse, that they might be exposed to on social media. On the other hand, doing so would also limit the child’s right to participation, information and expression, as well as the right to form their own person and identity – as protected under Articles 12 (respect for the views of the child), 13 (right to information and freedom of expression), 16 (right to privacy), and 17 (access to appropriate information). These latter rights are also essential in the digital environment, since social media often functions as a platform for participation, information and expression as well as identity formation and the exercise of autonomy. The two opposites – protection from and participation in – create a fundamental legal tension, which is something that could be understood in the light of Gregor Noll’s theory of conflict levels in legal reasoning. According to Noll, legal conflicts can be categorized into three levels of increasing complexity. The first level involves legal technical conflicts which are relatively straightforward and can be resolved through traditional legal tools, such as rules for conflict resolution between different regulations or interpretative principles. For instance, determining which national legal framework applies or clarifying how a specific legal provision should be interpreted. The second level consists of more complex normative conflicts, where two legal rights or norms clash – both carrying legitimate legal weight. These conflicts require more evaluative reasoning, often employing principles like proportionality (weighing competing interests) or coherence (seeking consistency within the legal framework). An example would be balancing the right to freedom of expression with the right to privacy. |
|